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Abstract 
 
The article deals with the methodological 
structuring of legal knowledge. It is common 
practice to specify two types of legal 
methodology: philosophical and judicial, yet the 
author demonstrates how new paradigmal 
parameters of legal metatheory manifest 
themselves. According to this metatheory, 
alternative concepts may be of the same order in 
a metatheoretical sense. The comparison of 
theoretical and metatheoretical levels of legal 
knowledge in the framework of three 
philosophical-scientific paradigms (comparative 
method) allows philosophy of law to answer the 
questions: what is law and why there exist 
multiple variants of legal consciousness. Authors 
demonstrate why the theme of competition 
between naturalistic and culture-centered 
research programs is secondary for legal 
metatheory and primary for judicial metatheory. 
The article offers criteria for unambiguous legal 
consciousness at the theoretical level of legal 
knowledge and identifies ultimate and reasonable 
grounds of legal consciousness. The paper 
concludes that special subdivisions of legal 
science, legal philosophy represents the 
paradigmal background of thinking, in the 
boundaries of which further interpretation 
schemes of theoretical and empirical levels of 
knowledge are made possible. 
 
Key Words: Philosophy of law, legal theory, 
legal metatheory, paradigm, comparative method. 
   
Аннотация 
 
Статья посвящена методологическому 
структурированию правовых знаний. Обычной 
практикой является определение двух типов 
правовой методологии: философской и 
судебной, однако автор демонстрирует, как 
проявляются новые парадигмальные параметры 
правовой метатеории. Согласно этой 
метатеории, альтернативные понятия могут 
быть одного и того же порядка в 
метатеоретическом смысле. Сравнение 
теоретического и метатеоретического уровней 
правового знания в рамках трех философско-
научных парадигм (сравнительный метод) 
позволяет философии права ответить на 
вопросы: что такое закон и почему существует 
множество вариантов правосознания. Авторы 
демонстрируют, почему тема конкуренции 
между натуралистическими и культурно-
ориентированными исследовательскими 
программами является вторичной для правовой 
метатеории и основной для судебной 
метатеории. В статье предложены критерии 
недвусмысленного правосознания на 
теоретическом уровне правовых знаний и 
определены предельные и разумные основания 
правосознания. В статье делается вывод о том, 
что специальные подразделения юридической 
науки, философии права, представляют собой 
парадигмальный фон мышления, в границах 
которого возможны дальнейшие схемы 
интерпретации теоретического и 
эмпирического уровней знаний. 
 
Ключевые слова: философия права, теория 
права, правовая метатеория, парадигма, 
сравнительный метод 
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Introduction 
 
Theoretical understanding is extrapolated to legal 
practice: none of legal theory or philosophy 
schools manage without a basic ontological 
mindset and an answer to the question, in which 
reality law exists; nor without a foundational 
gnoseological attitude: what truth is.  
 
The problem of the notion of law, common for 
legal science, acquires additional features 
connected with a qualitative change of judicial 
metatheory. Thus, “the principles of legal 
intersubjectivism imply the consideration of the 
social-cultural parameters of a specific society” 
(Sirazetdinova & Lukmanova, 2016, p. 373). 
Researchers move from individual explanatory 
schemes, appeal to specific schools of thought – 
phenomenology, communication theory, Neo-
Kantianism, resort to post-modernity – to the 
recognition of the polyparadigmal character of 
contemporary science and to the adaptation of the 
idea about distinguishing types of rationality to 
legal knowledge (Alexander, 2012). Legal 
consciousness concept represents “only some 
perspective of thinking about law”, so the 
solution of the problem of such diversity 
“appears in establishing metatheory” (Gostev, 
2016). According to this approach, any point of 
view on law represents uncontroversial 
knowledge and may expand to the scope of 
holistic comprehension of law. 
 
The standpoint of the paradigmal interpretation 
of law has its advantages, enriching 
methodological tools of legal science. Yet the 
mentioned standpoint is vulnerable due to the 
emergence of a new, more complicated 
epistemological problem – the multiplicity of 
metatheoretical views. “Legal theory” gradually 
goes out of the research vocabulary, being 
substituted for abstract “methodology” or 
“epistemology” (Bianchi, 2016) of law. The 
search for new directions of research to study law 
(Nagy, 2012, p. 62) results in the fact that 
philosophical-legal terminology increasingly 
fills the legal science discourse. At the same 
time, the formation of judicial metatheory is 
carried out in a disciplinary way (Zipursky 2006, 
Warner 2006), as it occurs in the research 
program, and not in a philosophical-scientific 
paradigm.  
 
The problem of distinguishing between 
philosophical and disciplinary metatheories is 
one of the key issues in modern philosophy of 
science. Legal metatheory monitors the 
paradigmality of legal knowledge in the 
framework of its own competences. Legal 
philosophy as metatheory explicates ultimate 
ontological, gnoseological and axiological 
foundations of legal concepts. It serves as a 
maximum interpretation scheme of disciplinary 
theories and metatheories evolution, as original 
ideas about the nature of law, its study principles, 
value-based status in society. Is this ultimateness 
“flexible”, is the subject matter under 
investigation ‘open”? Legal philosophy takes on 
the paradigmal point of view at any legal 
phenomena, conceptual foundations of their 
investigation. That is, the paradigmal 
interpretation of law is inherent in philosophy. 
The logic of philosophical and scientific-legal 
knowledge development predetermined the shift 
of the point of view in legal philosophy. Due to 
the evolution of philosophy of science 
distinguishing different types of scientific 
rationality, the methodological algorithm of 
study of law is becoming clarified to a great 
extent. 
 
Constructivism, neo-positivism, and post-
structuralism, having become mutually 
complementary due to their semiotic nature, 
shifted into the focus of post-non-classical 
jurisprudence. It is considered that they may 
become discursive strategies of legal 
consciousness and ways of legal communication. 
Some researchers justify the point that “focus on 
signs is the principal tool of constructing social-
legal reality” and as a result, the worldview basis 
of post-non-classics in legal sciences appears. 
 
The hypothesis of the present article: in 
contemporary legal thinking, there are two kinds 
of metatheoretical knowledge – tlegal and 
philosophical. The purpose of the research is to 
determine the main parameters of judicial and 
legal metatheory. 
 
Methodology 
 
In order to clarify methodological dualism – 
metaphysical and scientific methods of law 
interpretation – the research employs the 
principles of structuredness of legal knowledge 
and distinguishing types of scientific rationality.  
“Sectoral” interpretation of metatheory does not 
imply synthesis, but rather separate coexistence 
of the main legal consciousness concepts. That is 
why the research is based on the ideas that (a) 
disciplinary metatheory represents a higher level 
of scientific knowledge representing a three-tier 
structure; (b) philosophical metatheory is 
congruent with metaphilosophy of science, 
which is “on the one hand, the reflective level of 
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perception of science itself, and on the other, a 
result of applying cognitive resources of a certain 
philosophical system” (Lebedev, 2004, p. 130, p. 
254). 
 
Results and discussion  
 
The general theory of law and its metatheoretical 
level, along with economic and sociologic 
knowledge, comprise the “body” of a scientific 
paradigm. Legal metatheory does not fulfill the 
functions of philosophy of law; it supplies the 
material for legal metatheory. Common features 
of the established scientific paradigm manifest in 
legal, economic, sociological concepts.  
 
In legal philosophy, research strategies of 
modernity and post-modernity, naturalistic and 
culture-centered research programs are studied 
along with systemic, structural-functional and 
activity methodology: (a) as methodological 
support of aggregate scientific knowledge; (b) as 
structural components of legal metatheory, 
changing their paradigmal characteristics. 
 
It is only in legal philosophy that the unification 
of multiple judicial metatheories is possible. It is 
becoming clear that neither phenomenology, nor 
semiotics cover the whole field of post-non-
classical paradigm, and reducing of post-non-
classics to the new anthropologic turn leads to 
inefficient identification of non-classical and 
post-non-classical paradigms. The suggested 
constructivist-semiotic judicial metatheory does 
not shape the matrix of ultimate post-non-
classical explanation. As a matter of fact, in post-
non-classical philosophy of law, active creation 
of sign reality by the subject is viewed as a mere 
fragment of the systemic existence of law in its 
weakly nonequilibrium or strongly 
nonequilibrium state.  
 
In judicial metatheory, the way of presentation of 
worldview concept foundations plays a 
functional role. For legal metatheory, the 
common paradigmal logic of metaphysical 
presuppositions is important, as they play a 
substantial role. The explication of law through 
the notions of norm (Hakimi, 2018), justice 
(West, 2003; Hartz & Nielsen, 2015), freedom 
(Laborde, 2014; Hartz & Nielsen, 2015), formal 
equality (Nikolić & Cvejić, 2017; McGill, 2018; 
Laborde, 2014,) is quite legitimate and generally 
valid in the framework of the paradigm 
predominant at present time. It is only in legal 
metatheory that those definitions coil up into 
unified abstraction adequate for all patterns of 
scientific and non-scientific legal thinking. Thus, 
the positive effect is achieved with an 
explanation of the essence and structure of the 
legal method.  
 
The formation of legal metatheory in Russia is 
linked to the problem of broad interpretation of 
law. This is indirectly related to ontological 
issues, rather it is epistemological problem of 
gradation of different levels of legal knowledge, 
not relevant before. The so-called broad 
interpretation of law is specific for the theoretical 
and metatheoretical levels of legal knowledge on 
the scale from formal-logical descriptive 
language to complicated systemic analysis. A 
broad interpretation of law is the problem of 
competition between naturalistic and culture-
centered research programs, the gradation of the 
categorical framework, isolation of series of 
notions. Thus, the notion of a norm bears static 
operational content with a narrow interpretation 
of law and dynamic, significant components with 
the so-called broad interpretation of law. In the 
first case, at the theoretical level, the true notion 
of law is clarified, true not in the sense of the 
theory of truth correspondence, but in the sense 
of the theory of coherence, internally consistent 
theory. 
 
At the theoretical level, different conceptual 
positions should be aligned not in the framework 
of complementation of multiple interpretations of 
law, but in the limits of unambiguously 
understood social-functional nature of law. In 
other words, the narrow interpretation of law 
correlates with the classical theoretical-legal 
level of explanation. Definition of law as a 
measure of freedom is “own other” of 
understanding of law as a system of norms. At 
the theoretical level, no type of legal 
consciousness can have conceptual advantages. 
Legal knowledge is seen as a unified concept, not 
formed inductively, but on the contrary, 
diverging deductively. Each subdivision 
investigates specific manifestation of the social 
nature of law and any branch of the unified 
concept secure authenticity of certain legal 
consciousness. 
 
At present, substitution of etatism for systemic 
understanding about social reality where law is 
included into the mechanism of essential 
reproduction of reality lays the ontological 
foundation for the classical theoretical 
understanding of law. The aim of the social 
system is self-reproduction and the unity of its 
parts. Axiological foundations of such legal 
consciousness: for social life, keeping social 
order and normative behavior is a value. 
Gnoseological foundations of classical legal 
consciousness: mutual recognition of 
 
 
 
254 
Encuentre este artículo en http://www.udla.edu.co/revistas/index.php/amazonia -investiga o www.amazoniainvestiga.info                
ISSN 2322- 6307  
cohabitation rules as a result of collective and 
personal reflection determines the measure of 
freedom in the social system, and judicially 
significant actions are considered fair and 
reasonable. At the theoretical level, any type of 
legal consciousness reflects a certain aspect of 
correct, fair, normative reproduction of the social 
system and its parts. 
 
At the theoretical level of legal knowledge, the 
multiplicity of legal consciousness is formed not 
as a result of the drastic difference between 
conceptual and methodological standpoints, but 
as a result of the multidimensionality of 
manifestation of the essence of law in systemic 
social existence. Each type of legal 
consciousness expresses a certain form of 
existence of law as a way of reproduction of 
social order. It is significant that at the theoretical 
level, multiple interpretations of social reality do 
not influence the clear definition of law. Social 
reality may be understood in keeping with K. 
Marx as the classical systemic existence of 
economic and social-political regularities 
(Csaba, 2012). Social reality may also be 
interpreted in the post-non classical way in 
keeping with N. Luhmann as a self-reproducing 
system consisting of operations and events 
(Ladeur, 2006). The social-functional 
interpretation of law is acceptable for micro-legal 
theory as a function of the state (Tan, 2018) and 
macro-legal theory emerging into social reality. 
 
In judicial metatheory, the broad interpretation of 
law becomes a special research topic embracing 
the whole range of gnoseological and ontological 
innovations. The task of the post-non-classical 
legal methodology is to provide a social-cultural, 
conceptual and methodological assessment of 
available legal knowledge. The possible sense of 
existence and functioning of law is thus reflected. 
In legal sense, historical and cultural states of 
social reality, mental peculiarities of individuals 
and social groups, objective social-economic 
circumstances, subjective political strategies and 
“stereotyping as monological, one-sided 
assessment of other social subjects and social 
phenomena” correlate to each other (Lukmanova 
& Sirazetdinova, 2016), as well as many other 
factors of “environmental” existence of law 
(Edmundson, 2013). The fact of undividedness 
of law and its environment expands the 
ontological foundations of the metatheoretical 
level. Various environmental conditions 
determine the priority values of the present time, 
which leads to the anticipated expansion of 
axiological foundations of understanding about 
law. “Internal” systemacity entails with 
“external”, law in itself is a parameter of 
systemic social existence susceptible to nonlinear 
variation. On the other hand, the knowledge 
domain of contemporary legal theory expands 
due to emphasizing role of juridical reflection. 
Importance is being increasingly attached to the 
full-scale comparative analysis of existing 
concepts with the aim to find balanced, 
unambiguous understanding of law. 
 
How to relieve the problem of the multiplicity of 
legal consciousness concepts at the theoretical 
level of legal knowledge? One of the possible 
ways is to secure the status of classical scientific 
knowledge for the theoretical level. This implies 
focus on its single-essence definition, a study of 
law and not its interpretation, involvement of all 
approaches (including natural-legal) in the 
naturalistic research program. The legitimacy of 
such a solution is connected with the 
impossibility of elimination of the classical 
scientific paradigm in contemporary scientific 
knowledge. Substantial definitions come to the 
foreground; that is why the interpretation of law 
cannot be only formal, procedure-oriented and 
functional, it necessarily retains value-based 
targets. 
 
The paradigmal frame in legal science points at 
the uniformity of disciplinary concepts. In 
judicial metatheory, a paradigm appears, 
manifests itself and becomes the subject domain 
of legal philosophy. Legal metatheory reflects 
both the subject domain and ways of its 
interpretation from the paradigmal perspective. 
Questions “what is law?” and “how to study it?” 
remain “open” in terms of the peculiarity of 
philosophical knowledge and “closed” in the 
sense of ultimate explanation for the current 
period.  
 
Even with the broad interpretation of law, its 
metatheory does not coincide with legal 
philosophy; they differ in the same way as 
contemporary science and philosophy of science. 
Legal theory and metatheory shape a content-
related, empirical basis on which philosophy of 
law further reflects. It employs exclusively 
philosophical tools, which remind of the “broad” 
language of law only terminologically. Thus, 
legal philosophy turns to legal hermeneutics 
serving both as a way of interpretation of the 
sense of law in metatheory and a specific school 
of thought. However, the context of the 
corresponding philosophical-scientific paradigm 
provides the ultimateness of explanation. Due to 
the paradigmal aspect, for example, a significant 
difference in the ontological and gnoseological 
foundations of the legal hermeneutics of Ancient 
Rome (classical paradigm) and legal 
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hermeneutics of Dvorkin (non-classical 
paradigm) is becoming clear. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In legal science, the metatheoretical level is 
determined by research programs which define 
sufficient grounds of integrated legal 
consciousness, and the achieved epistemological 
results present the topic of special investigation 
in legal metatheory. Legal philosophy presents 
self-reflection in the framework of paradigmal 
assumptions, stepping to ultimate parameters of 
integrated legal consciousness. Philosophical 
knowledge comprises generalized worldview 
methodological experience in a given moment of 
time.  
 
Discussions on the authenticity of types of legal 
consciousness directly and indirectly facilitate 
the formation of modern legal metatheory. A 
further analysis of the epistemological 
opportunities of legal metatheory will be 
effective for its self-identification. 
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